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brief

POSITIONING FAMILY PLANNING QUALITY
WITHIN HEALTH FINANCING FOR UHC:
CONNECTING THE DISCOURSE
INTRODUCTION
Financing is a major challenge and concern for the future of the delivery of voluntary family planning (FP) services to clients, particularly in low- and middle-income
countries with high unmet need and limited method choice. As countries commit to
universal health coverage (UHC), it is crucial that UHC schemes include FP and other
reproductive health (RH) services. Strategic purchasing of quality FP services from
public and private - including for profit and not-for-profit - healthcare providers could
accelerate progress toward UHC.
It is increasingly recognized that the FP2020 goals will not be met without adequate
attention to quality; and that a sustained focus on quality of care requires financing at
the policy and program levels. While the importance of sustainable financing may be
recognized, the ‘how’ of financing for quality FP within the context of UHC is not well
understood.
This brief targets the ‘bridge’ constituency that is coalescing between the health
financing and FP communities of practice around a shared interest in making access
to health services universal. With this brief, we aim to identify opportunities for the
FP community of practice to advocate for the inclusion of quality, voluntary, and equitable FP services within UHC and health financing discussions.

METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE

AUGUST 2019

This technical brief drew on selected published and grey literature on quality of care, FP
and UHC. The technical brief is divided into four sections:

•

Section 1: outlines the quality and the UHC agenda, their grounding in rights,
challenges with measurement, and how financing arrangements may affect quality

•

Section 2: outlines quality and FP, its client-oriented genesis, challenges with
routine measurement, and efforts to analyze FP performance within financing
arrangements

•

Section 3: outlines quality and strategic purchasing for FP, using the five Ps
analytical framework to illustrate implications for the provision of quality FP
services

•

Section 4: summarizes three important aspects of strategic purchasing for FP
quality – the use of FP data and evidence to inform purchasing, FP quality by
design and FP quality by implementation within purchasing schemes
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1. QUALITY AND UHC
Quality and sustainable financing of UHC are interlinked.
Quality underpins sustainable financing as public support for
– and the sustainability of – financing of UHC may be undermined by poor quality. Quality also underpins UHC as health
services must be of high enough quality in order to improve
health (Starrs et al, 2018). This is defined as effective coverage, a modified measure of population coverage, based on
functional access to quality services (Shengelia et al, 2005).
While some lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have
achieved UHC, they have not achieved effective coverage.1
In Mexico, for example, where substantial progress toward
UHC has been achieved over time, effective or quality-corrected coverage of health services remains relatively low and
uneven across states (Lozano et al, 2006, in Akachia and
Kruk, 2017).
UHC quality objectives are grounded in rights and
people-centered care. Many LMICs constitutionally guarantee
the right to health care for their citizens. Furthermore, many
LMICs espouse integrated people-centered health services
(IPCHS). This approach, adopted by WHO member states
in 2016,2 is intended to provide services that are of better
quality, are financially sustainable and more responsive to
individuals and communities (Box 1). While aspirational
in many contexts, IPCHS signals intent to reorient service
delivery and health financing away from hospital-based,
disease-based and “silo” curative care models, as these run
counter to the provision of universal, equitable, high-quality
and financially sustainable care (WHO, 2016). Ensuring that
the UHC mandate is met requires backing the policy framework with sustainable financing.
While quality is integral to UHC, its measurement is ‘inadequate to the task’ (Akachia and Kruk, 2017). Ideally
structure, process and outcomes measures, as defined by
Donabedian’s theory of quality (1988), would be tracked
and linked. However, this does not tend to occur in practice.
Partly this is due to a lack of consensus on how to measure,
with many tools of ‘substantial variation in their content and
comprehensiveness’ in use (Akachia and Kruk, 2017). Most
of these address ‘structure’. ‘Process,’ such as interpersonal care and the patient experience, and ‘outcomes’ linked
to quality of care provided in the health system, are rarely
measured. This is partly due to cost and the budget constraints under which ministries of health operate. Prioritization of quality is also a factor, with trade-offs made between
ensuring effective service coverage and minimum quality
standards (Akachia and Kruk, 2017).
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BOX 1. Approach to people-centred care
“All people have equal access to quality health
services that are co-produced in a way that meets their
life course needs, are coordinated across the continuum
of care, and are comprehensive, safe, effective, timely,
efficient and acceptable; and all carers are motivated,
skilled and operate in a supportive environment”.
Source: Framework on integrated, people-centred health
services, page 4. WHO, 2016

Financing arrangements may work at cross purposes with
UHC quality objectives. While health policies may set out
explicit standards of quality, these may be mediated through
financing arrangements, which may work at cross purposes
to people-centered quality care. For example, these may
influence how institutional providers (facilities and health
systems) and individual healthcare workers provide health
services with implications for quality (McLoughlin and
Leatherman, 2003). Health financing arrangements may also
generate additional costs, through the underuse, overuse,
and misuse of interventions and services (McLoughlin and
Leatherman, 2003).

2. QUALITY AND FP
FP, like UHC, is grounded in client rights and people-centered care. Commencing in 1994 with the International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo,
the rhetoric of population control was replaced with individual rights to dignity, sexual and reproductive health, and
the right to plan one’s family (UNFPA, 2014). This spurred
a sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) movement that increasingly placed the user at the center of
service delivery, with a focus on choice, equity, and quality
as rights. These elements feature in the Quality of Care
Framework, first developed by Bruce (1990) and updated by
Jain and Hardee 2018 (Box 2). The ‘Bruce-Jain’ framework,
as it is commonly known, and the updated Jain-Hardee
version, feature structure, process and outcome elements,
in line with the Donabedian theory of quality. Box 2 provides a description of each of the six process elements in
the framework. This framework, well accepted by the FP
community, is referenced in many program settings and
has been employed to design, develop and influence new
models of client-centered FP.

Effective coverage is defined as the probability that someone who needs an intervention will get it and have their health improved as a result.
The IPCHS approach was adopted by Member States at the World Health Assembly in May 2016

FIGURE 1. Bruce-Jain FP quality of care framework
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BOX 2. Updated Bruce-Jain process elements of quality
of care in FP
Impacts
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• Client satisfaction
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• Service use
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• Appropriate
constellation of
services

Source: Based on Jain and Hardee, 2018

While quality is integral to FP, there is less consensus on its
routine measurement. There are many tools to assess the
quality of FP services, however, there is lack of agreement
on their routine use (Sprockett 2017). Recent studies have
validated quality measures appropriate for routine reporting
in FP service delivery settings, finding that higher values on
the FP quality measures were associated with increased
contraceptive use and reduced discontinuation (Jain et al,
2013; Jain and Winfrey, 2017; Chakraborty et al, 2019; Jain
et al, 2019; Holt et al, 2019). While the evidence and the
validated metrics are promising, measurement of rights such
as client autonomy in service delivery settings can be further
improved (Bertrand et al, 2014; Cole et al., 2019). Where
standard indicators from readily available data sources exist,
there is a need to strengthen their adoption. Where standard
indicators are lacking, new metrics are needed, to foster
greater consensus on routine measurement of FP quality.
There have been some recent efforts to analyze FP ‘performance’ within health financing mechanisms. This has
included systematic reviews of specific financing models,
such as community financing and community-based health
insurance (Karra et al, 2016), conditional and unconditional
cash transfers (Khan et al, 2016), introducing, removing, or
changing OOP costs or user fees (Korachais et al, 2016),
results-based financing (Blacklock et al, 2016), performance-based incentives (Bellows et al, 2014), and social protection programs that provide a voucher subsidy
(Bellows et al, 2016). These studies and others have not
specifically looked at the quality of FP provided under such
schemes using the Bruce-Jain framework or related elements. However, out of these and other efforts, a community
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Choice: Be able to offer a range of contraceptive
methods
Information exchange: The provision of information to
clients and the solicitation of information and preferences from clients
Technical competence: Availability of trained providers
competent in sterilization operation and/or in insertion
and removal of reversible clinical methods (e.g., IUD,
implant) as well as to ensure safety and compliance
with infection prevention practices in delivering these
services
Interpersonal relations: Relations that uphold dignity,
respect, privacy, and confidentiality
Mechanisms to encourage continuity: Information
exchange should include follow-up requirements and
guidance on the possibility of switching the method,
provider, or service outlet
Appropriate constellation of services: Integration of FP
with other RH services such as safe abortion/post-abortion care; testing and treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases, including HIV; and gender-based violence
services
Source: Based on Jain and Hardee (2018)

of practice and research agenda have coalesced around FP
measurement, including aspects of client-centeredness and
rights, within specific purchasing instruments.3

3. QUALITY AND FP PURCHASING
There are a variety of approaches to purchasing FP
services, each with potential implications for quality as
outlined in the Bruce-Jain framework. When used strategically, these may enhance equity in the distribution of
resources, increase efficiency, manage expenditure growth
and promote quality in health service delivery (WHO, 2017).
Strategic purchasing is intended to be an active approach, a
‘continuous search for the best ways to maximize health
system performance by deciding which interventions
should be purchased, how, and from whom’ (RESYST,
2014). Purchasing schemes, procuring on behalf of the

See, for example The Collectivity https://www.thecollectivity.org/en/projects/right-based-approach.

3

TABLE 1. 5P and Bruce-Jain frameworks for FP
Purchasing domains
Polities: Why to
purchase (rationale
and institutional
arrangements)

Purchasing elements
•
•
•
•
•

Political commitment
Institutional arrangements
Purchaser alignment
(across mechanisms)
Monitoring and accountability
Performance
management

•
•

•
•

•

People: For whom to
purchase

•
•
•

Defined target
clientele
Clientele awareness
Community and
society engagement

•
•
•
•

Package: What to
purchase

•
•

Provider: From whom to •
purchase
•
•

Defined benefit
objectives
Defined benefit
package

•

Contracting
Accreditation
Integration (e.g. of
public and private
providers)

•

•

•
•
•

Payment: How to
purchase
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•
•
•
•
•

Payment rates
Payment methods
Provider autonomy
Claims processing
Quality assurance
(data and clinical)

Bruce and Jain
framework

FP considerations

•

•
•

Societal benefits
•
(SRHR, gender equality,
public health impact)
•
Economic benefits
(women’s participation •
in the labor force and
demographic dividend)
Normative environment
and ability to realize
rights for FP
Stewardship and
ownership (e.g.
government and
donors, central and
decentralized)
Fragmentation and
adequacy of financing
(horizontal and vertical
coherence)

Policy/political
support
Resource
allocated
Program
management/
structure

Unmet need
Equity (e.g. poor
women and men,
adolescents)
Client continued use
(through method
choice)
Financial barriers/
out-of-pocket
expenditure
Broad method mix to
•
improve choice, enable
switching, and reduce •
discontinuation
FP integration into
RMNCAH continuum/
packages

Choice of
methods
Appropriate
constellation of
services

Physical access/choice
of outlet
Minimum quality
standards
Integration of the
private sector
Client realization of FP
rights

Technical
competence
Information given
to clients
Interpersonal
relations
Follow up/
continuity
mechanisms

Likelihood of being
offered choice of FP
method (e.g. provider
behavior)
Efficiency and quality
Regulatory and public
financial management

•
•
•
•

health system, may include national health insurance,
voucher programs, results-based financing and input-based
budgets or a combination thereof. To illustrate how purchasing elements may support or constrain FP quality, the
5P framework (Appleford and RamRao, 2018) (Table 1)
has been overlaid to the Bruce-Jain framework. Following
the table, we describe how the different elements of FP
purchasing may influence quality of care with particular
focus on “for whom to purchase”, “what to purchase”, “from
whom to purchase” and “how to purchase.”
People: for whom to purchase
For whom to purchase has implications for FP access.
These considerations do not feature explicitly in the BruceJain framework but are reflected in ‘program effort’ (see
Figure 1), if this is directed towards equity of access. Progress toward UHC is intended to remove financial barriers
to access to quality health services. However, FP financial
barriers for women and girls may not be recognized or
prioritized within UHC schemes, even by the FP community,
given other supply- and demand-side barriers (Lie et al,
2015). It is estimated that out-of-pocket (OOP) payments
comprise nearly half (49%) of the costs of reproductive, maternal, neonatal, and children’s healthcare (Lie et al, 2015)
and will account for most of the financing for FP products
over the next three years (RHSC, 2018). Financing through
OOP for FP may not be viewed as catastrophic or a financial
hardship for women and girls but may result in unplanned
pregnancy and recourse to unsafe abortion, with potentially
catastrophic consequences for the individual and her family; furthermore the health system will bear costs due to the
management of mistimed or unintended pregnancies.
FP choice may reflect price rather than preference. This
extends to decisions to seek FP services, from whom,
and what methods to use. A study by Ugaz et al (2016)
found that, in 17 of 30 countries, a greater proportion of
poorer women used short-acting methods over long-acting
methods than wealthier women, suggesting that financial
barriers may suppress choice. For adolescents, cost may
deter them from accessing health services altogether, more
so than adults. This may be due to their limited capacity
to access services independent of their parents, and their
limited access to cash, either their own or that of their
family (Waddington and Sambo, 2015). The WHO global
consultation on adolescents indicated that very few (6%)
adolescents pay OOP for health services with many (45%)
reporting that their parents and/or family members were
the principal payers of their healthcare costs (WHO, 2019),
which are unlikely to include FP or other SRH services.
When financial barriers are removed, an individual may be
able to act upon their preference to both seek and choose

a FP method. However, it is recognised that other barriers
may exist and intersect with financial ones.
Package: what to purchase
What to purchase has implications for FP choice and
an appropriate constellation of services. While governments often prioritize essential health services in benefits
packages, this does not always include FP. Research by
Eldridge and Appleford (2016) found that only six of 14
government-sponsored health insurance schemes in USAID
FP priority countries included FP in their benefit package
(no information was provided on constellation of services).
Service exemption schemes for maternal and child health
(MCH), such as those in Sahelian countries, may also fail
to include FP as part of a continuum of care (Appleford and
Camara, 2018; Mazzilli et al, 2016). Even when FP is included in a benefits package or service exemption scheme,
this may not translate to provision. A seven-country study
of health insurance schemes (Ross et al, 2018) concluded that despite the formal inclusion of FP services in the
national benefits packages examined, actual integration of
these services faced challenges, with implications for the
availability of FP services in practice. A study in India also
found that use of FP under the national health insurance
scheme was low, estimated at 2%, with poorer families less
likely to know of its inclusion (Mozumdar et al, 2019).
The FP community may conflate FP inclusion in benefits
packages with choice. However, this may not account for
user preference in outlets or differential requirements of
FP methods. For example, non-clinical outlets, such as
pharmacies or shops may be preferred by some users, who
desire methods, such as condoms and emergency contraception, that does not require visiting a medical facility
(Bertrand et al, 2014) and prefer a more anonymized, less
interpersonal transaction. Long-acting reversible contraception (LARCs) on the other hand may benefit from explicit
inclusion in a benefits package, given that these methods
require a clinical setting and have additional competency
and consumable requirements for their delivery. These
differences may not be reflected within the global FP community, which may advocate for equal treatment of all FP
methods within benefits packages, without a more nuanced
view of requirements.
Payment: how to purchase
How to purchase within UHC schemes has implications for
service quality. This is an important determinant of whether
and how well services are provided. This includes more
observable quality measures, such as technical competence and follow up/continuity mechanisms, as well as less
observable quality measures such as interactions related to
information given to clients and interpersonal relations.
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Payment mechanisms can influence the extent to which
individuals can genuinely choose the FP method of their
choice (Holtz and Sarker, 2018). Increasingly, LMICs are
experimenting with different payment approaches and may
blend two or more payment mechanisms For example, in
Kenya, FP is included under capitation for short-term and
long-acting methods and under fee-for-service for permanent methods within the National Hospital Insurance Fund
(NHIF). The NHIF is implemented in public facilities where
line item budgets cater for FP inputs such as health worker
time and commodities and private facilities where there is
no budget support.
A selection of payment mechanisms is featured to demonstrate their potential influence on FP quality. However, ideally performance of individual payment mechanisms would
be considered holistically in a mixed provider payment
system (McIsaac, 2018).
Line item budgets
Family planning services have historically been financed
using input-based methods. These input-based methods
use a salary schedule for individual healthcare providers,
based on their cadre, qualifications, and other factors. If
providers are compensated regardless of service volume,
they are free to spend as much time as needed with each
patient and to tailor their services to the needs of the
individual, potentially optimizing the information exchange.
However, lacking any incentive toward service provision and
quality, unmotivated providers may feel disinclined to offer
complicated or expensive methods or procedures, such as
LARCs or permanent methods.
Fee for service
Fee-for-service payments may create diverse financial
incentives for providers to deliver “more, less, or different
services” (Holtz and Sarker, 2018). Fee-for-service may be
the most precise way to pay for actual services and can
be used to encourage delivery of priority services (Holtz
and Sarker, 2018). This may have the opposite effect of
input-based payments, such as a health worker salary, and
influence providers to perform services that require greater
clinical skills, consumables and counseling. While this form
of payment may improve the offer of LARCs and permanent
methods, there are concerns within the FP community that
this may result in over provision. However, a best practice
guidance suggests that differential payment of FP methods
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such as LARCs is appropriate, if this is in line with reimbursement rates for other services (Eichler, 2018).
Results-based payments
Results- and performance-based financing (PBF)4 is
purchasing of health services linked to a goal or result.
When goals are linked to quality, efficiency, or positive
health outcomes, this may be a strategy for improving quality of services, although evidence of its impact on quality is
inconclusive (Akachia and Kruk, 2017). If goals are linked
to quantity of services provided, this may disincentivize
quality by emphasizing the numbers of clients served with
FP. In practice, many of these payment mechanisms have a
quantity-based result and a quality-based modifier (Cole et
al, 2019). A recent multi-country review (Cole et al, 2019)
sought to map the extent to which PBF reflected quality,
informed choice and volunteerism, using the principles of
the Bruce-Jain framework. This review found 452 FP-related
indicators used in PBF schemes, 57 quantity-based performance indicators and 395 questions to assess the quality
of FP services (Cole et al, 2019). The review concluded that
rights elements were not uniformly represented and a more
systematic approach to rights-based implementation of FP
services in PBF programs is needed.
Specific indicators, such as new users, may also run counter to Bruce-Jain quality elements. Many PBF schemes count
new FP users as a primary measure. However, this measure
can have multiple definitions including first-time user, new
to the provider (e.g., provider-changer), new to the method
(e.g., switching methods), not recently using a method (e.g.,
lapsed user), and even additional user (Dasgupta et al.
2017). Irrespective of definition, a focus on new users has
been associated with less diverse method mix, greater provider bias, or more frequent commodity stock-outs and may
reflect users having limited information and fewer options
(RamaRao and Jain 2015). PBF schemes may also focus on
method-specific indicators, linked with higher-level impact
measures such as the relative effectiveness of specific
methods or a desire to remove price as a barrier to consumer
choice (Cole et al, 2019). This may be an important PBF
objective in contexts where there is low overall utilization of
modern FP, high reliance on short-term methods, such as
condoms, and financial barriers to method choice such as
LARCs.

Performance-based financing (PBF) programs are considered a specific subset of RBF initiatives and are distinguished by a focus on monetary incentives to healthcare
providers for achieving agreed performance measure under certain conditions.
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Capitation
Capitation is a payment arrangement for health care
service providers that pays a set amount for each enrolled
person assigned to them, per period of time, whether or
not that person seeks care. It is a form of payment that
places the provider, and not the purchaser, at risk for the
amount and quality of services used (Holtz and Sarker,
2018). As a prospective payment made to providers on a
per-person, per period basis for a defined set of services,
capitation is thought to create better alignment of financial
incentives between healthcare purchasers and providers.
It is well suited to pay for predictable and commonly used
services. It is less well suited for the full range of FP services
unless this is explicitly rewarded. This mode of payment forces providers and facilities to work within a budget, which
can incentivize more efficient care, prioritizing those with
the greatest needs. However, this also may influence facilities to effectively ration quality, by minimizing the expense
spent on each patient/client. Given this, the rate of capitation matters to quality - in theory, the higher the rate, the
more likely a provider receives sufficient revenue to provide
needed services, with good quality. Conversely, a low rate of
capitation may compromise quality.

(Campbell et al, 2015 in Holtz and Sarker, 2018). Women also select providers based on OOP cost; clients may
choose a private provider for short-term methods that are
more affordable but seek more expensive methods such as
LAPM from public providers, where the service may be free
or nearly free for the consumer (Ugaz et al. 2013).

4. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER
Service quality should inform resource allocation decisions
and strategic purchasing arrangements. This should be
supported by available data and evidence, even though
not all FP quality elements from the Bruce-Jain framework
may be represented. Some process quality elements, such
as interpersonal care and client experience, are difficult to
routinely measure, and thwart quality measurement in UHC
more broadly. Given this, effort may be better placed on a
normative environment for FP quality and rights evidenced
through political commitment, national stewardship and
ownership of FP programs (this equates to ‘program effort’
in the Bruce-Jain framework). Situating FP service quality
within broader efforts to achieve and measure effective
coverage of UHC is recommended.

Capitation may act as a disincentive for the provision of
resource-intensive FP methods. When considering a voluntary service such as FP that is predominantly used by
women, a provider could attract a mix of patients who
use many FP services, yet receives the same capitation
payment as another provider who provides few or no FP
services. Additionally, if FP services are included in a capitation payment for a set of PHC services, all other things
held equal, providers would have a financial incentive to
provide short-acting methods since those methods are the
most efficient (e.g. quick and cheap) to provide. This is one
argument for “carving out” FP from capitation payments
for primary care and paying for it on a fee-for-service basis
(whether with case rates or at the service level).

The FP community should advocate for FP ‘quality by
design’ within purchasing strategies. This would shift
attention to the design of purchasing strategies and their
effects on FP process elements in the Bruce-Jain framework. At present, FP quality is addressed as service units in
the Bruce-Jain framework, and may benefit from a broader
systems lens. Quality by design could include use of purchasing metrics that reduce risk of missed opportunities
and promote the inclusion of quality FP within a continuum
of care. For example, FP could be rewarded within antenatal and postnatal care as part of a quality modifier to
PBF schemes. This would better align with UHC quality and
health systems objectives of integrated people-centered
care.

Provider: from whom to purchase

The FP community should ensure that purchasing strategies support a client-oriented or rights-based approach
to high quality services. The quality of FP services is
determined by measuring service inputs, processes and
outcomes. FP purchasing strategies may incentivize high
quality but still fail to strengthen a rights-based approach.
Implementing FP purchasing strategies from a rights-based
perspective asks which policies will help to make the FP
service universally accessible, acceptable, and available.
Regardless of the purchasing strategy selected in a given
context, the FP community of practice has an obligation to
ensure that the purchasing strategy supports a rights-based
approach to high quality FP services.

‘Healthy competition’ through client choice of provider is
also an important aspect of quality. This may allow women and couples to select providers that have higher client
perceptions of quality, such as short waiting times or more
informative and interpersonal interactions with clients.
While choice of provider is not explicit in the Bruce-Jain
framework, it is implicit in framework impacts as it may be
associated with greater client satisfaction, acceptance and
continuation of contraception. According to a recent study,
the private sector provides 37% of FP services globally,
making a significant contribution to access; of this share,
over half (54%) of FP services are provided by medical providers, 36% by specialized drug sellers, and 6% by retailers
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